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On December 30, 1993, the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approved gabapentin, a drug marketed and
distributed by Parke-Davis Pharmaceuticals Company, for
"adjunctive therapy in the treatment of partial seizures ... in patients
above the age of 12 years."' The drug was hailed as a welcome
advance in the study of epilepsy, a field that scientists are only
beginning to understand.2 In clinical trials, gabapentin's results were
impressive. In one study, gabapentin corresponded with a fifty
percent reduction in seizures for twenty-three percent of epileptic
patients, in comparison to a nine percent reduction in the placebo
group.3 Gabapentin's potential use, however, may well extend beyond
treatment of seizures. Although it will not be a 'miracle solution' to
all ailments involving neuropathic pain,4 numerous studies suggest
that gabapentin may have uses far beyond the scope of its FDA
approval.
I Alicia Mack, Eramination of the Evidence for Off-Label Use of Gabapentin, 9 J.
MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 559, 559 (2003).
2 See James Le Fanu, In Sickness and in Health: Breaking the Pain Barrier, TELEGRAPH
(U.K.), Dec. 15, 2002 (Health), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/health
advice/4712479/In-sickness-and-in-health-breaking-the-pain-barrier.html; Sally Squires, New
Drug For Epilepsy: Patients Have Waited 15 Years for an Advance in Medication, WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 1993 (Health), at 9 ("Despite its long and well-documented history, epilepsy remains a
poorly understood condition.").
3 See PARKE-DAVIS, NEURONTIN (GABAPENTIN) CAPSULES, NEURONTIN (GABAPENTIN)
TABLETS, NEuRoNTIN (GABAPENTIN) ORAL SOLUTION 7-8 (2009), available at
http://www.pfizer.com/files/products/uspi-neurontin.pdf (physician prescribing information for
Neurontin).
4 See David Perlman, New Drugs Being Tested for Pain Relief, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14,
1998, at A4.
s See, e.g., Udo Bonnet et al., Treatment of Acute Alcohol Withdrawal with Gabapentin:
Results from a Controlled Two-Center Trial, 23 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 514
(2003); Atul C. Pande et al., Gabapentin in Bipolar Disorder: A Placebo-Controlled Trial of
Adjunctive Therapy, 2 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 249 (2000); Michael Rowbothan et al., Gabapentin
for the Treatment of Postherpetic Neuralgia: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 280 JAMA 1837
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Parke-Davis' marketing budget makes it clear that encouraging
these potential alternative uses for the drug was a priority. In 1998
alone, Parke-Davis budgeted over $11 million for professional
education events, such as dinner meetings with doctors, intended to
"[m]aximize [o]pportunities in '[e]merging [[u]napproved] [u]ses. "'6
In total, Parke-Davis allocated approximately $40 million for its
Neurontin advertising budget in 1998.7 Due in part to its marketing
practices, Neurontin has been prescribed by physicians for a plethora
of uses outside the scope of its FDA approval, including treatment of
bipolar disorder, attention deficit disorder, restless leg syndrome, and
migraine headaches.8  As much as seventy-eight percent of
Neurontin's $1.3 billion in sales for 2000 can be attributed to uses
outside the scope of the drug's FDA approval "without clinical
evidence of safety or effectiveness."9
The use of drugs like gabapentin for purposes not approved by the
FDA is referred to as off-label use.o Although drug companies are
not allowed to promote drugs for off-label uses, the FDA "does not
regulate the practice of medicine and recognizes that physicians may
determine that prescribing a drug off label constitutes good care.""
Thus, despite the marketing restrictions, manufacturers utilize a
number of methods to promote off-label uses of pharmaceuticals,
including paying for professional education sessions, hiring speakers,
engaging in direct mail campaigns, and reprinting favorable journal
articles.12 In recent years, many of these tactics have come under fire
in a barrage of qui tam lawsuits brought against pharmaceutical
(1998) (describing use of gabapentin for treatment of shingles).
6 Michael A. Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of Gabapentin: An
Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 284, 287 tbl.2 (2006),
available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/145/4/284.pdf.
7 See id.
8 See Mack, supra note 1, at 562-65.
9 Id. at 562.
1o See, e.g., Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of
the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (noting that "off-label prescribing" means
"the prescription of a medication in a manner different from that approved by the FDA").
1 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-835, FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE
PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 2 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08835.pdf. Although physicians are permitted to prescribe off
label, the FDA explains that, as a matter of good medical practice, physicians have a
responsibility "to base [any off-label] use on firm scientific rationale and on sound medical
evidence." See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, "Off-Label" and Investigational Use of
Marketed Drugs, Biologics and Medical Devices, http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/Special
Topics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidanceslnformationSheetsandNotices/ucml 16355.htm.
12 See Steinman et al., supra note 6, at 287 tbl.2.
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companies under the False Claims Act.13  As a result, while
pharmaceutical companies are facing record-breaking fines for their
unlawful business practices-Pfizer's $2.3 billion settlement for
off-label marketing included the largest criminal fine in history and
was its fourth settlement over illegal marketing since 2002-these
same companies continue to engage in off-label marketing.14
Pfizer's strategy for Neurontin is no exception to this trend.
According to Dr. Kay Dickersin of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg
School of Public Health, Pfizer, through its Parke-Davis division,
used "a publication strategy meant to convince physicians of
Neurontin's effectiveness and misrepresent or suppress negative
findings."15 For example, although physicians prescribe Neurontin to
treat depression,16 recent studies have shown that its use doubles the
risk of suicidal behavior. However, despite the drug's generic status
and the ongoing controversy surrounding its off-label use, Neurontin
continues to generate substantial income for Pfizer, grossing $387
million in sales in 2008.
13 See, e.g., Jack Dew & Jack Zemlicka, Amended False Claims Act Has Lawyers
Advising Caution: Universities, Hospitals Among Potential Targets, Wis. L.J., Aug. 25, 2009,
http://www.wislawjournal.com/article.cfm/2009/08/3 1/Amended-False-Claims-Act-has-lawyers
-advising-caution-Universities-hospitals-among-potential-targets (noting that Eli Lilly settled
with the Department of Justice for $1.4 billion based on allegations that it promoted Zyprexa for
off-label uses); Andrew Jack, Pfizer Agrees to Plead Guilty in Painkiller Case, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2009, at 15, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d86bc890-9821-11 de-8d3d-00144
feabdcO.html (noting that Pfizer agreed to a $2.3 billion settlement with the U.S. government
based on allegations that it illegally promoted its painkiller, Bextra).
14 See Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 32, 2009, at B4.
15 S. Swaroop Vedula et al., Outcome Reporting in Industry-Sponsored Trials of
Gabapentin for Off-Label Use, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (2009); Stephanie Saul, Experts
Conclude Pfizer Manipulated Studies, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2008, at B4 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16 See Sarah Yasmin et al., Adjunctive Gabapentin in Treatment-Resistant Depression: A
Retrospective Chart Review, 63 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 243, 246 (2001) (stating that
gabapentin is potentially helpful in the "management of treatment-resistant depression").
17 See U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Serious Health Risks with Antiepileptic Drugs
(Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucml07332.htm (finding
that use of certain antiepileptics, including gabapentin, increases the risk of suicidal thoughts
and behaviors by an estimated 2.1 per 1,000 patients); see also Bernadette Tansey, Doctors
Warned of Drugs' Danger: Anti-Epilepsy Medications Tied to Risk of Suicide, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 1, 2008, at Cl (discussing the FDA's findings).
18 Posting of Jim Edwards to BNET, What Docs Didn't Know About Pfizer's Neurontin,
http://industry.bnet.com/pharma/10003276/what-docs-didnt-know-about-pfizers-neurontin/?tag
=shell;content (July 24, 2009); see also Margaret Cronin Fisk et al., Pfizer Faces First Trial on
Neurontin Suicide Claim, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 24, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601127&sid=alCYnBA5tGV4. Pfizer's patents on the gabapentin molecule and its
only approved use have expired, bringing the drug into the public domain as a generic drug.
However, Pfizer has subsequently filed patents on a new form of gabapentin intended to treat
neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's, Huntington's and Parkinson's disease. FED.
TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY, at
A-31 to -32 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.
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Rather than addressing these recent high-profile litigations, this
Note will focus on the regulatory underpinnings of off-label
marketing. While the FDA does not regulate a physician's decision to
prescribe FDA-approved drugs for off-label uses, its recent
"Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution
of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference
Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices" ("Guidance") does offer
regulatory guidelines that permit manufacturers to use medical
journals as promotional materials.'9 This Note will argue that this
guidance is problematic for a number of reasons. First, despite its
claims to the contrary, the Guidance attempts to implement a
legislative rule under the guise of a non-legislative document.20
Second, and more importantly, the measures proposed in the
Guidance are insufficient both to protect the public and keep
physicians properly informed of medical advances regarding off-label
uses of prescription drugs. In effect, the current Guidance allows
pharmaceutical companies to market their products for uses that have
not been approved as safe and effective by the FDA.
Section I will outline the notice and comment rulemaking
procedures under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Good Guidance Practices adopted by the FDA. Section II will then
recount the evolution of regulations restricting the distribution of
journal articles promoting off-label uses of drugs by pharmaceutical
manufacturers, while Section III will explore the current regulatory
structure. Section IV will then evaluate whether the current Guidance
satisfies the qualities of a guidance document, or whether it should
have been promulgated as a legislative rule. Finally, Section V will
recommend that the FDA replace the current Guidance with a
legislative rule that prohibits manufacturers from distributing journal
articles that primarily promote off-label uses for their drugs.
I. NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING
In 1938, Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA") in response to public outcry against the marketing of
untested drugs,2 1 delegating additional power to the FDA.22 In order
1 U.S. FooD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY ON GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES
FOR THE DlsTRIBUTON OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED
OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES], available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/op/goodreprinthtml (Guidance went into effect in January 2009).
2o See discussion infra Section IV.
21 See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription
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BOUND GUIDANCE
to act within Congress's authority, the FDA must comply with the
minimum requirements imposed by the APA's notice-and-comment
procedures.23 In addition, the FDA has created additional,
self-imposed procedural requirements for interpreting the
Congressional Act or carving out new legislative rules.24 Taken
together, these requirements shape the FDA's exercise of its
rulemaking power.
Much of the FDA's regulatory power, including its ability to
regulate off-label drug use, stems from its informal rulemaking
authority. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") defines a rule
as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of an agency . *... This definition includes
legislatively binding rules, as well as policy statements, such as
guidance documents, intended to establish non-binding best practices
for agencies.26 According to the APA, informal rules must undergo
"notice and comment" 27  unless the agency is attempting to
promulgate "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice."
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48
RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 893 (1996) ("In 1937, however, over one hundred people died and others
were seriously injured as a result of ingesting a drug known as Elixir Sulfanilamide, a product
which had never been tested for safety before marketing. The public outcry over the Elixir
Sulfanilamide incident spurred Congress to undertake the necessary process of reforming
federal drug law." (footnote omitted)).
22 See id. at 894. The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act required that all new drugs be
tested and reviewed for safety by the FDA before commercial distribution. Id. at 894.
23 See James Hunnicutt, Note, Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory System:
Agencies' Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153, 156-57 (1999)
("When a court reviews an agency's actions, the court looks first to the agency's organic statute
and second to the APA as the default statute.").
24 Id. at 177-78.
25 Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2006).
26 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1315
(1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Bind the Public].
27 Agencies utilizing the notice-and-comment procedure must publish a general notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, including "(1) a statement of the time, place, and
nature of [the] public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which
the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(l)-(3). The agency must then provide at
least thirty days for interested parties to submit their data, views, or arguments for agency
consideration. See id. § 553(c)-(d).
- Id. § 553(b)(A). In 2007, the Office of Management and Budget published a "Final
Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices," calling for the increased use of
notice-and-comment procedures for significant guidance documents. See Final Bulletin for
Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007).
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Notice-and-comment rulemaking exists to allow for public
participation and input into the informal rulemaking process. 29 Such
participation "increases accountability and oversight, provides better
quality information for both decision makers and participants,
minimizes excessive influence of powerful interests, and promotes
proceduralist values that enhance the fairness and legitimacy of a
rule."3 0 Agencies can impose stricter procedures for notice-and-
comment rulemaking, but the procedures outlined in the APA provide
a baseline for agency action: reviewing courts turn first to the
agency's rulemaking procedures, and then to the APA procedures.
The FDA is one of many agencies that impose stricter procedures
than are required by the APA for non-legislative rulemaking.32 Under
section 553(b) of the APA, interpretative rules and general statements
of policy do not have to go through notice-and-comment
proceedings.33 Despite this exemption, the FDA, however, still
imposes requirements akin to notice and comment on its interpretative
rules and general policy statements, placing both under the umbrella
of guidance documents. FDA guidance documents include
"documents prepared for FDA staff, applicants/sponsors, and the
public that describe the agency's interpretation of or policy on a
regulatory issue."3 Guidance documents are subject to two different
levels of public scrutiny based on the nature of the document. Level 1
guidance documents "(i) [s]et forth initial interpretations of statutory
or regulatory requirements; (ii) [s]et forth changes in interpretation or
policy that are of more than a minor nature; (iii) [i]nclude complex
scientific issues; or (iv) [c]over highly controversial issues."35 Level 2
guidance documents include all guidance documents not classified as
Level 1 that "set forth existing practices or minor changes in
interpretation or policy." 3 6
For Level 1 guidance documents, the FDA must publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and invite public
comment, requirements that largely 37 mirror the APA notice-and-
29 See Stephanie Stem, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. Prrr. L. REv. 589, 594 (2002).
3 Id.
31 See Hunnicutt, supra note 23, at 156-57 ("When a court reviews an agency's actions,
the court looks first to the agency's organic statute and second to the APA as the default
statute.").
32 Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2009).
3 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
- 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(b).
3Id. § 10. 115(c)(1)(i)-iv).
36 Id.§ 10.115(c)(2).
3 See id. § 10.1 15(g)(I)-(3).
536 [Vol. 60:2
BOUND GUIDANCE
comment procedures for legislative rules. 38 Even after the Level 1
document has been finalized, the public can continue submitting
comments for consideration should the agency deem it appropriate to
undertake future revisions.39 In comparison, Level 2 guidance
documents are implemented as soon as the FDA posts the document
on the Internet.4 The FDA still allows for the submission of public
comments following publication of Level 2 guidance documents, and
reserves the right to revise the documents when appropriate.4 1
II. THE EVOLUTION OF OFF-LABEL REGULATION
As a default rule, the FDCA prohibits the marketing of drugs for
42
uses the FDA has not approved. However, both Congress and the
FDA have sought to make a limited exception to the rule in the case
of marketing through scholarly journal articles.4 3 On December 8,
1995, the FDA published two draft guidance documents addressing
the dissemination of journal articles: "Guidance to Industry on
Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published, Original Data" and
"Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts"
(collectively, "Guidance Documents")." The Guidance Documents
permit dissemination of journal articles promoting off-label uses so
long as: (1) the principal subject of the article is a use approved by the
FDA; (2) the article is published in a peer-reviewed journal; (3) the
information that is different from the drug's FDA approval is clearly
labeled; and (4) the reprint discloses all material facts without being
false or misleading.45 The FDA allowed interested parties to submit
comments until January 5, 1996, and finalized the Guidance
Documents on October 8, 1996, noting that the guidelines "strike the
proper balance between the need for an exchange of reliable scientific
38 See id.
39 See id. § 10.1 15(g)(3)(i)-(ii).
40 See id. § 10.1 15(g)(4)(i)(A)-(B).
41 See id. §§ 10.1 15(g)(4)(i)(C) & (g)(4)(ii).
42 See 21 U.S.C. H§ 331(d), 355(a) (2006) (banning the introduction of drugs into
interstate commerce without FDA approval); see also 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6) (2009) (setting
forth the circumstances under which drug advertisements are false, lacking in fair balance, or
misleading, and therefore in violation of the FDCA's prohibition against misbranded drugs);
Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Commissioner, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov. 30,
2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/waxmanletter_113007.pdf
(arguing against a proposed agency loophole that would allow circumvention of FDA approval
for off-label drug use).
43 See Food & Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-1 (2006);
GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 19.
44 Advertising and Promotion; Draft Guidances; Republication, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,384 (Dec.
8, 1995).
45 Id. at 63,384-85.
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data and information within the health care community, and the
statutory requirements that prohibit companies from promoting
products for unapproved uses.'A
In 1998, the Washington Legal Foundation ("WLF"), a nonprofit
public interest law and policy center, sought to enjoin the FDA from
enforcing the policies put in place by the two guidance documents.4 7
As relief, the WLF sought a declaratory judgment "that the FDA
policies expressed in the Guidance Documents violate the rights of its
members under the First Amendment of the Constitution.'A8
Specifically, the WLF alleged that the use of journal articles to
promote off-label uses of FDA-approved pharmaceuticals qualified as
protected free speech.49
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman,o the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Guidance
Documents were an unconstitutional restriction of commercial
speech.5 1 The court applied the three-factor test set forth in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp.5 2 for determining whether speech
qualifies as "commercial speech."63 Bolger established that the First
Amendment affords a lesser degree of protection to commercial
speech because such speech does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction."5 The three factors are: (1) whether the
speech was an advertisement; (2) whether the speech referred to a
specific product; and (3) whether there was an economic motivation
in conducting the speech.ss
In Bolger, Youngs Drug Products Corporation attempted to mail
the general public unsolicited advertisements containing information
about its products, along with information regarding venereal disease
and family planning.56 The government sought to enforce a federal
statute that prohibited companies from mailing unsolicited
46 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8, 1996).
47 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by 36
F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal
Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
48 Id.
49 See id. at 59.
0 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999),
appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
s1 See id. at 72-74.
52 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
5 Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
54 Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748,762 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 See id at 66-67 (noting that all three factors must be present for speech to be
"commercial").
56 See id. at 62.
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contraceptive advertisements. 7 The Court held that the pamphlets
were advertisements, that the pamphlets made reference to the
specific contraceptive product, and that Youngs had an economic
motivation for mailing the pamphlets.59 Separately, each factor would
have been insufficient to constitute commercial speech.6 All together,
however, the factors supported the Court's conclusion that despite the
informational nature of the pamphlets, the communication constituted
commercial speech.6
Applying these factors in Washington Legal Foundation, the
district court held that the dissemination of journal articles qualified
as an advertisement despite the fact that the manufacturer was
communicating the words of others.62 While the court acknowledged
that "[sIcientific and academic speech reside at the core of the First
Amendment," 63 the court clarified that directing attention to favorable
information also qualifies as an advertisement. 4 Since the journal
article advertisements referred to a particular product and the
manufacturer had a clear economic motive to disseminate them, the
communication qualified as commercial speech. 65 The court then
turned to the question whether the manufacturer's commercial speech
was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment."
Whether commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection is determined using the test set forth in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.67 In
Central Hudson, a gas and electricity company challenged a ban on
advertisements promoting the use of electricity in New York.6 8 The
Supreme Court used the following four-part analysis to determine
whether the ban on commercial speech was constitutional:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
s7 See id. at 63.
58 Id. at 66 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762).
59 See id. at 66-67.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 67.
62 Id. at 62-63.
63 Id. at 62.
6 See id. at 63.
6 See id. at 63-65.
6 Id. at 65.
67 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68 See id. at 560.
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yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.69
Thus, in certain situations, the government can restrict commercial
speech consistent with the First Amendment.
Applying the four prongs of the Central Hudson test in
Washington Legal Foundation, the district court first held that the
commercial speech was "neither unlawful nor inherently misleading"
because prescribing drugs for off-label purposes was not illegal.7 0 The
court reasoned that since the journal articles were describing the
benefits of off-label uses without pharmaceutical involvement, they
were not deceptive or coercive speech; nor were they inherently
misleading.7 Second, the court held that, in addition to the
government's substantial interest in protecting the "health and safety
of its citizens," 72 the FDA also had a substantial interest in
incentivizing manufacturers to "get off-label uses on-label"73 by
applying for supplemental new drug applications.74 The district court
further held that the Guidance Documents' restrictions directly
advanced this substantial interest by controlling labeling, marketing,
and advertising efforts of off-label uses in order to incentivize
manufacturers to seek further approval.
Examining the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, however,
the court found that the Guidance Documents were an
unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because they used
overly restrictive means to satisfy the FDA's purposes.76 The court
reasoned that the "full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the
manufacturer" of off-label uses served as a less-burdensome
alternative that would address the FDA's concerns more effectively
than the measures contained in the Guidance Documents. The court
noted that disclosure would inform physicians of the potential for
misleading bias, and that the narrow scope of the communication
6 Id. at 566.
o Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65-66.
71 See id. at 67-68.
72 Id. at 69.
7 Id. at 70.
74 See id. at 71. However, the court rejected the proposition that the government had a
substantial interest in ensuring that physicians can make informed prescription choices based on
accurate and unbiased information, since the fear that physicians might misuse the information,
without more, was deemed unsupportable. Id. at 69-70.
75 Id. at 72.




through journal articles still provides manufacturers incentives to get
FDA approval for off-label uses in order to use alternative marketing
efforts. 8 The court also noted that physicians are reluctant to
prescribe drugs without FDA approval, and that off-label uses are the
most effective treatment for many conditions.79
In 1997, the FDA passed section 401 of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act ("FDAMA"),so which explicitly
created a safe harbor from the prohibition on marketing off-label use
for journal articles.8 ' Although the bill was signed into law on
November 21, 1997, it did not go into effect until a year after its
enactment,82 and therefore did not apply to Washington Legal
Foundation.8 3 The FDAMA required that manufacturers label articles
as promoting off-label use if: (1) the information related to a use
unapproved by the FDA; (2) the manufacturer paid to disseminate the
information; or (3) the authors had a significant financial interest in
the manufacturer.84 In addition, the manufacturer was required to
85include a bibliography of other relevant scientific publications.
Manufacturers were required to submit medical journal articles to the
FDA before distributing them, and had to agree to file a supplemental
new drug application expanding FDA approval for the drug to its
off-label use within three years of the journal's initial dissemination
by the manufacturer.86 The FDAMA, however, included a sunset
provision that caused the law and any regulations promulgating it to
expire on September 30, 2006.7 Since Congress failed to renew the
Act, the law regarding off-label use reverted to the prior framework
that prohibited any promotion for strictly unapproved uses.
78 See id.
7 See id.
80 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401, 111 Stat. 2295, 2356-65 (1997) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 360aaa (2006)) (repealed 2006).
81 Bruce Patsner, Promotion of Off-Label Uses of Prescription Medical Products: FDA's
Proposed New Guidance, HEALTH L. PERSP., June 2008, at 1, 3, available at http://www.law
.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2008/(BP)%20off%20label.pdf.
82 FDAMA § 401(d), 111 Stat. at 2364 (1997).
83 See Wash. Legal Found., 13 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
8 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b)(6)(A)(i)-(iii) (repealed 2006).
85 Id. § 360aaa(b)(6)(B).
86 See Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed Drugs,
Biologics, and Devices, 21 C.F.R. § 99 (2009).
87 See FDAMA § 40 1(e), 111 Stat. at 2364; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
FDA Proposes Guidance for Dissemination of Information on Unapproved Uses of Medical
Products (Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/2008/ucml 16859.htm.
88 Patsner, supra note 81, at 1, 3.
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M. THE CURRENT GUIDANCE
The FDA attempted to fill the regulatory twilight left in the wake
of the FDAMA's sunset provision with a new draft guidance
document. A copy of an internal draft reached the Congressional
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, leading the
Committee's Chairman Henry Waxman to write an appeal to Dr.
Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Commissioner of the FDA.89 The letter
noted that "[t]he draft guidance . . . would, in effect, allow drug and
device companies to short-circuit FDA review and approval by
sponsoring drug trials that are carefully constructed to deliver positive
results and then using the results to influence prescribing patterns."
Congressman Waxman went on to state that "[tlhe draft guidelines
appear to be an effort by [the] FDA to displace Congress and
establish by administrative fiat a new system for use of journal
articles that lacks the safeguards set by Congress ... permit[ting] far
more dissemination of articles on unapproved uses than was
sanctioned under [the] FDAMA." 91 In his reply, Dr. von Eschenbach
noted that the proper time to comment on the draft guidance would be
after the draft guidance completed internal review and was subjected
to public comment through the Federal Register.9 2
On February 15, 2008, the FDA published the draft guidelines in
the Federal Register, accepting public comment until April 15, 2008
as a Level 1 guidance document. The rule was finalized on January
13, 2009.93 According to the Guidance, drug manufacturers should
only reprint scientific or medical journal articles that are published in
peer-reviewed journals with an editorial board of experts, and that
require all involved parties to disclose conflicts of interest.94 Journal
articles promoting off-label uses should not originate in a special
supplement or journal funded by the manufacturer, and should not be
primarily distributed by the manufacturer.95 The articles should not be
8 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform to
Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Commissioner, M.D., Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Nov.
30, 2007), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/waxmanletter_1130
07.pdf.
9 Id. at 1.
9 Id. at 5-6.
9 See Letter from Stephen R. Mason, Acting Assistant Comm'r for Legislation, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform
(Dec. 21, 2007).
9 See Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of
Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694
(Jan. 13, 2009).




written, edited, excerpted, or published by the manufacturer, and must
be distributed in their entirety without markings or characterizations
from the manufacturer.96 The information in the articles should not be
false or misleading and cannot pose a "significant risk to the public
health."97 In addition, the article should be accompanied by a
"comprehensive bibliography of publications discussing adequate and
well-controlled clinical studies" published about the use, as well as
copies of any articles that specifically call its veracity into question."
The article should not accompany the product, and should be
distributed separately from promotional materials.99 Finally, the
article should include a statement disclosing the following: (1) that
the use has not been approved by the FDA; (2) the manufacturer's
interest in the drug; (3) any author known to have a financial
relationship with the manufacturer; (4) any person known to have
provided funding for the study; and (5) any significant risks known by
the manufacturer that are not discussed in the journal article.'"
Several significant concerns were raised in the notice-and-
comment proceedings for the now-finalized draft guidance. The
American Medical Association, for instance, expressed concern that
the current system of peer-review for medical journals would be
incapable of identifying inaccurate and unbiased articles, citing
several industry practices that complicate their vetting processes.101
Furthermore, the Illinois and Oregon attorneys general noted that
three elements present in the FDAMA's prior legislation were omitted
in the Draft Guidance.1tn These omissions would significantly reduce
the ability of both the FDA and state attorneys to limit deceptive
practices. 10 3 In particular, the attorneys general noted that the Draft
Guidance eliminates requirements that:
96 Id. at 4-5.
9 Id. at 5.
9 Id. at 5-6.
9 Id. at 6.
10old.
101 See Letter from Michael D. Maves, Executive Vice President & CEO, Am.
Med. Ass'n., to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId-0900006480509
aea&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (submitting comments on the Draft Guidance
that discussed the AMA's concerns about the peer-review process as a safeguard against
industry manipulation).
1o2See Letter from Lisa Madigan, Illinois Attorney General and Hardy Myers, Oregon
Attorney General, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. 1-2 (Apr. 21, 2008),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectld-0900006 4 80518
fe6&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (commenting on the Draft Guidance and urging
the FDA to adopt additional safeguards to prevent manufacturers from using the loophole to
avoid the approval process).103Id. at 1.
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1) Drug manufacturers must have filed an application for
FDA approval of the new use of the drug before that off-label
use can be discussed in medical literature to be distributed to
health professionals; 2) Medical literature must be submitted
to the FDA for review before the information is distributed to
medical professionals; and 3) Drug manufacturers must
biannually prepare and submit a list of all the articles and
references on the new use that were disseminated to health
professionals, and a list of the categories of providers that
received the literature pertaining to the new use.
The final guidance document responded to some of these concerns. In
particular, the FDA noted that, due to the sunset of section 401 of the
FDAMA, mandatory review practices were outside the agency's
purview. 0 5 In an attempt to respond to concerns that pharmaceutical
companies would use journal articles to indefinitely promote off-label
uses without applying for new FDA approval, the FDA also added a
section to the finalized Guidance encouraging manufacturers to seek
FDA approval for new uses of FDA-approved drugs. 106
It is important to note that the timing of the guidance document's
finalization was likely influenced by the political climate. In a public
letter dated September 17, 2008, Democratic Congressman Henry A.
Waxman accused FDA Commissioner von Eschenbach of prioritizing
pharmaceutical industry desires over consumer interests.10 7 According
to the letter, the FDA, in anticipation of the changing administration,
planned to push through a number of measures highly favorable to
drug companies "in record time."108 Furthermore, the FDA timed the
publication of the final version of the Guidance during President
Bush's last week in office, creating the appearance that it was passing
a midnight regulation. 1"
Midnight regulations describe the "systematic tendency across
time and across parties to increase regulatory volumes during the
" Id. at 1-2.105 See Guidance for Industry on Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of
Approved Drugs and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices; Availability, 74 Fed. Reg. 1694
(notice Jan. 13, 2009) ("The sunset of [Section 401] eliminated the authority of FDA to require
submission of articles for the agency's review before dissemination . . .
106 See id.
10 See Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Sept. 17, 2008), available
at http://www.pharmalive.com/News/download.cfm?articleid=572507&attachmentid=83365.
10 See id. at 2.
109See Lisa Richwine, FDA Lets Drugmakers Advise Doctors on Unapproved Uses,




waning days of an administration."'"0 During midnight periods,
agency accountability to the public is largely absent, since
administrations attempt to either postpone their actions until after
elections in order to avoid political fallout, or hurry to implement the
administration's agenda before the change of administration in the
next political term."' Avoiding public accountability runs counter to
one purpose of the notice-and-comment procedure.
Generally, agencies do not devote resources to issuing
non-legislative rules as midnight regulations. Since non-legislative
rules such as guidance documents are intended to create general
policies rather than binding law, the value of rushing legislation
through is diminished. Moreover, since non-legislative rules are not
intended to create practically binding norms, administrations
generally have less reason to be concerned about political fallout
stemming from guidance documents.1 2 Thus, under the Clinton
administration, only one interpretive rule and one policy statement
were issued between November 5, 2000 and the end of his
administration.113 Since the APA generally requires agencies to
follow the same procedures for promulgation and revocation of
regulations, most interpretive rules or policy statements can be
revoked relatively easily by publishing notice of revocation in the
Federal Register.' However, since the FDA uses the more extensive
notice-and-comment procedure for its guidance documents, that
might impose a greater burden on the subsequent administration.115 In
light of the history of midnight regulations, the FDA's decision to
release the Guidance so close to the end of the Bush Administration
seems to be a break from tradition, warranting closer scrutiny into the
true nature of the Guidance.
IV. SHOULD THE GUIDANCE BE A LEGISLATIVE RULE?
The FDA promulgated a functionally binding legislative rule in the
guise of a non-binding guidance document. Upon first impression, the
110 Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the "Midnight"
Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1441, 1442 (2005) (quoting Jay Cochran, I, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations
Increase Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 15 (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/The Cinderella_Constraint
(1).pdf) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I ISee id. at 1446-47.
I
12 Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 969
(2003).
H
3 See id. at 967.
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FDA's Guidance resembles a guidance document. In addition to
explicitly referring to itself as such, the header notes that:
This guidance document represents the Food and Drug
Administration's current thinking on this topic. It does not
create or confer any rights for or on any person and does not
operate to bind FDA or the public. You may use an
alternative approach if the approach satisfies the requirements
of the applicable statutes and regulations. If you want to
discuss an alternative approach, please contact the
appropriate FDA staff.116
In recent years, agencies are increasingly issuing guidance documents
"in lieu of engaging in the more costly, and binding, informal
rulemaking process. . . ."n Professor Robert Anthony has observed
that agencies improperly use guidance documents to impose
practically binding rules on the regulated or benefited public."' The
misuse of guidance documents by federal agencies, in particular, has
drawn attention from Congress, corporations, and academics as a
backdoor method of creating binding norms without following the
proper procedures.1 9 The misuse of informal rulemaking instruments,
such as guidance documents, to create practically binding norms
makes it necessary to inquire whether regulating the dissemination of
journal articles by manufacturers should have been issued as a
binding legislative rule, a non-binding policy statement or guidance
document, or as a congressionally authorized statute.
In Community Nutrition Institute v. Young,' 20 the court addressed
the language necessary to make a regulation legally and practically
binding. In Community Nutrition, a regulation purported by the FDA
to be a policy statement limiting the amount of "'poisonous or
deleterious substances' in food" was challenged due to the legally
binding effect of the regulation. 1 2 1 Although the FDA claimed the
regulation's action levels were not binding, the use of mandatory,
"
6 GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 19.
"
7 Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: Rethinking the
Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 371, 372 (2008) (emphasis added).
1 8 See Anthony, Bind the Public, supra note 26, at 1315 (arguing that agency guidance, to
the extent it goes beyond interpreting the regulatory language, should not bind the public).
"
9 See Christopher E. Wilson, Comment, Not Good Enough For Government Work: How
OMB's Good Guidance Practices May Unintentionally Complicate Administrative law, 59
ADMIN. L. REv. 177, 181 (2007) (noting that, despite guidance producing some positive effects,
its misuse has been a major cause for concern).
120 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
121 Id. at 945 (citation omitted).
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definitive language in the text gave the regulation binding force. 12 2
Since the purported policy statement did not go through notice-and-
comment procedures, the court held that the FDA violated APA
procedural requirements and invalidated the regulation.12 3
Legislative rules are distinguishable from non-legislative rules,
such as interpretive rules and policy statements, because they bind, or
attempt to bind, the affected public. 124 Legislative rules include rules
that purport to be legally binding, as well as rules that have the
practical effect of binding the public.12 5 Robert Anthony explains that
non-legislative rules are practically binding to the affected public "if
the agency treats it the same way it treats a legislative rule-that is, as
dispositive of the issues that it addresses-or leads the affected public
to believe it will treat the document that way."1 2 6 In contrast,
interpretive rules merely seek to interpret existing law rather than
create new law, and policy statements create general statements of
policy or procedure that are neither binding nor interpretive.127
The FDA's finalized Guidance regarding manufacturer distribution
of journal articles recognized that the lapsed FDAMA had created a
safe harbor rather than an interpretation of the limitations on drug
marketing in the FDCA.128 In doing so, the FDA accepted that
Congress banned the promotion of off-label drug usage through the
FDCA, but then created a legislative exception to that rule that
mirrored the FDAMA's provision. So rather than interpreting an
existing rule, the FDA sought to amend the existing rule to provide a
safe harbor. And while the Guidance uses clear language disclaiming
any intent to be legally binding, 12 9 a number of factors indicate that
the practical effect of the rule will be to create a practically binding
norm.
According to the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), the
FDA issued 117 regulatory letters for "violative promotions of
prescription drugs" between 2003 and 2007.130 Of these regulatory
letters, 42 were in response to off-label promotional efforts.131 Half of
2 See id. at 947.
23 Id. at 948-49.
124 See Anthony, Bind the Public, supra note 26, at 1314.
125 See id. at 1327 (noting that when agencies issue rules and claim they are nonlegislative,
courts must still determine whether the rules are binding).
126 Id. at 1328.
127 See Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spurious"
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 7, 11 (1994) [hereinafter Anthony, Lifting the
Srog].
128 See GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES, supra note 19.129 Id.
1soGAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
'31 Id. at 6.
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the letters pertaining to off-label promotions addressed materials
specifically targeted at physicians that would be governed under the
auspices of the new Guidance.132 FDA officials with the Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications ("DDMAC")
informed the GAO that drug companies had complied with the letters,
so the FDA did not pursue enforcement action through the
Department of Justice.'33 During this time period, drug companies
could challenge the FDA's regulatory letter and negotiate to avoid
taking corrective measures by petition.13 4 While DDMAC officials
noted that drug companies would occasionally engage in extensive
discussions challenging agency assessments, between 2003 and 2007,
the FDA did not reverse any of its decisions requiring drug companies
to cease disseminating violative off-label promotions.'35 Thus, while
the FDA's judgments were non-binding in name, they had a
practically binding effect on drug companies.
Tens of thousands of promotional materials are submitted to the
FDA for review every year.136 The DDMAC informed the GAO that
they received more materials than the agency could review. 137 Since
the FDA is overburdened, it exercises its discretion in pursuing claims
against only a fraction of materials it actually reviews.' 3 8 Under the
new Guidance, the FDA is purportedly not legally bound to follow its
guidelines since the document uses discretionary language instead of
mandatory language. However, if prior enforcement history is any
indication, the manufacturers should expect to be practically bound
by the guidelines and therefore subject to a legislative rule. According
to DDMAC officials and the GAO's analysis, drug companies
generally comply with the actions requested in FDA regulatory
letters. 39 Furthermore, every time a drug company contested an FDA
determination during the five-year period covered in the GAO report,
the FDA upheld its regulatory decision.'
The FDA may be tempted to argue that since both Level 1
guidance documents and legislative rules go through substantially
similar notice-and-comment procedures, the distinction between the
two is moot. The Good Guidance Practices adopted by the FDA that
require notice-and-comment proceedings for Level 1 guidance
'
2 Id. at 20.
133 See id. at 6.
134 See id. at 22.
1
s Id.
136See id. at 17 fig.1.
137 Id. at 16.
38 Id. at 5.
1391d. at 6.
4 See id. at 22.
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documents are non-binding; so as long as the FDA can present an
appropriate justification for deviating from the guidance, the rule is
merely subject to APA procedures. And since both the APA and
Level 1 guidance documents are subject to almost identical
notice-and-comment procedures,142 the Guidance essentially satisfied
the requirements for legislative rulemaking under the APA.
While the Guidance assiduously complied with the procedural
formalities necessary to create binding law, it failed to provide proper
notice to the public of its practically binding intent. Issuing notice
prior to rulemaking serves a signaling purpose to the public. A private
party examining a Level 1 guidance document replete with
non-binding language is more likely to overlook or disregard the
document, and trust the agency to utilize its discretion.143 That same
party, however, might take a binding legislative rule more
seriously.'" Because of its failure to issue notice of its intent to create
a binding rule, the FDA denied the public the opportunity to
knowingly participate in notice-and-comment procedures for the
creation of a binding, legislative rule. As Robert Anthony explains,
regulations that purport to be policy statements but are practically
treated as binding by the agency should be invalidated as an attempt
to circumvent the legislative rulemaking procedures.145 Here, when it
issued the final Guidance as a midnight regulation mere days before a
change of administration, the FDA attempted to minimize the
political accountability of decision makers.146 And by issuing its rule
under the guise of a discretionary policy, the FDA attempted to
downplay the potential impact of the Guidance, which was intended
to be both substantive and binding.14 7 Because the FDA has failed to
satisfy the informal rulemaking procedures required under the APA
for binding legislative rules, the Guidance should be invalidated.
141 See Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115(d) (2009).
142 See discussion supra p. 536-37 (discussing public scrutiny requirements for Level 1
guidance documents).
143 See Hunnicutt, supra note 23, at 181
144Id.
145 See Anthony, Lifting the Smog, supra note 127, at 10 (classifying such regulations as
"spurious rules," and asserting that, while these rules are technically policy statements, they
should not be exempt from APA requirements for legislative rulemaking).
'"See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing the general absence of
agency accountability during "midnight" periods).
147 See discussion supra Section 1II (noting that despite disclaimers of intent, the Guidance
will create a legally binding norm).
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V. PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE RULE
As a result of the procedural problems in the formulation of the
current Guidance, the FDA should issue a revised legislative rule
through notice and comment that not only clearly indicates its binding
nature, but also grants the public a chance to provide the FDA with
informed input about the rule. The FDA should use this opportunity
to reintroduce previously abandoned limitations on drug companies to
ensure that physicians have information that will promote the safest
medical treatment for their patients' conditions. The new rule should
reinstate the terms of the 1996 Guidance Documents, paired with the
FDAMA constraints. 148 In particular, manufacturers should be
required to file a supplemental new drug application for the new use
prior to disseminating journal articles primarily promoting an
off-label use, and manufacturers should be limited to distributing
journal articles that primarily address FDA approved uses of the
drug.149
The purpose of the FDA approval process is to ensure that drugs
are not approved unless they are "safe and effective."150 Due to
numerous precautions taken in the approval process, however, the
FDA delays the availability of a host of potentially life-saving
treatments. 51 Allowing physicians to issue drugs for off-label use
helps to reduce the potential loss of life by granting physicians greater
freedom over the treatment process.152 However, the current Guidance
provides a backdoor that allows manufacturers to market
pharmaceutical drugs for new off-label uses and circumvent the FDA
approval process entirely. 53 As Dr. Aaron S. Kesselheim asks, "[i]f a
drug company can go directly to the physician with its published trials
without having to go through the FDA first, why would it ever go
before the FDA?"' 54 Reinstating the requirement from the lapsed
FDAMA15 5 that manufacturers must first submit a supplemental new
drug application for a given off-label use before distributing journal
'4 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances; Republication, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8,
1996); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa (repealed 2006).
149 Advertising and Promotion; Guidances; Republication, 61 Fed. Reg. at 52,801; 21
U.S.C. § 360aaa-3.
IsOJonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and
the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173, 195 (2000).
15 1 Id. at 195. For instance, during the nine-and-a-half-month review process for
Misoprostol, a drug that prevents gastric ulcers, the drug could have saved as many as 8,000 to
15,000 lives. Id at 196.
15 2 See Stafford, supra note 10.
15 3 See Mike Mitka, Critics Say FDA's Off-Label Guidance Allows Marketing Disguised as
Science, 299 JAMA 1759, 1759 (2008).
1s4Id. at 1760.
155 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa-3 (repealed 2006).
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articles to physicians that primarily focus on that use would still give
physicians access to potentially life-saving information, while
ensuring that drug companies do not have the unrestrained ability to
market their drugs for any use supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence.
However, requiring manufacturers to apply for the expansion of
supplemental drug applications is not enough to properly protect
patients. Manufacturers would still be incentivized to apply for drugs
under narrow uses supported by copious amounts of research in order
to receive the drug's initial certification, and then attempt to
drastically extend the scope of the drug's use by filing applications
for new uses of the drug. Supplemental new drug applications can
take even longer to approve than the initial application for FDA
approval, 15 6 so manufacturers could extensively market off-label uses
while awaiting the FDA's response. Therefore, the FDA should also
restrict manufacturers awaiting approval through the supplemental
process to distributing articles that deal primarily with the drug's
already approved purpose. Physicians would still be able to read
articles detailing off-label uses of drugs in medical journals or
through conversations with their peers.
Admittedly, the court in Washington Legal Foundation found the
1996 Guidance Documents unconstitutional, holding the limitations
on article distribution to be overly restrictive in light of the
alternatives. 15 7 The court viewed full disclosure of any conflicts of
interest as a sufficient and less burdensome alternative for advancing
the FDA's interests.158 In making this determination, the court relied
on estimations that off-label use only accounted for a small
proportion of drug use. 159 However, recent case law and research
studies suggest that restrictions previously deemed unconstitutional
might pass constitutional muster.1
Four years after Washington Legal Foundation, the Supreme Court
in Thompson v. Western States Medical Centerl61 applied a
commercial-speech analysis to the FDAMA's prohibition on unlawful
' See Katherine A. Helm, Note, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician's
Office: A Century of FDA Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 134 (2007).
'5 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by 36
F. Supp 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found.
v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
58 Id. at 73.
159 See id. at 56 (citing a study that found that off-label use of the sixty-four most
frequently prescribed drugs constituted only 4.7% of the use of patented drugs and 2.0% of the
use of non-patented drugs).
'o See infra pp. 553-57.
161535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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or misleading advertising. 16 2 Thompson addressed the validity of a
blanket restriction on the advertising or promotion of compounded
drugs by pharmacies, pharmacists, or physicians.' 63 Once again, the
Court's decision hinged on the final prong of the Central Hudson
test-whether the government could achieve its interests in a less
restrictive manner.'" And once again, the Court held that the
government failed to meet the necessary standard, noting that "there
is no hint that the Government even considered" alternatives to an
outright ban on commercial speech by the affected parties. 165
Although the Court in Thompson established that prohibiting
manufacturers from informing 6 hysicians of off-label use is
unconstitutional in some cases, the 1996 Guidance Documents
allowed manufacturers to disseminate journal articles promoting
off-label use, as long as the article focused primarily on the drug's
approved use.167 Thompson involved a blanket prohibition preventing
drug companies from advertising compounded drugs under any
circumstances, preventing drug companies from large-scale marketing
of compounded drugs in any context.16 8 In comparison, the 1996
Guidance Documents merely regulated the context of off-label drug
use. Moreover, since Washington Legal Foundation, less restrictive
guidelines, such as those set forth in the FDAMA, have proven
ineffective at serving the government's substantial interest in ensuring
manufacturers seek approval for off-label drug uses. In fact, courts
have consistently found that "constraining the marketing options of
manufacturers is one of the 'few mechanisms available' to the FDA to
ensure that manufacturers will not seek approval only for certain
limited uses of drugs, then promote that same drug for off-label
uses . . . ."169 Manufacturers have incentives to use the safe harbor
162 Id. at 368 (noting that the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis provides an
"adequate basis for decision").
163 See id. at 360. The restriction at issue was in section 127(a) of the FDAMA. See 21
U.S.C. § 353a(c) (2000).
14See Thompson, 535 U.S at 371-73 (discussing less restrictive alternatives to the blanket
prohibition on advertising of compounded drugs).
16 5 Id. at 373.
'66 See United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Thompson, 535
U.S. 357), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 94 (2008).
167 See Advertising and Promotion; Guidances; Republication, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct. 8,
1996).
168 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371.
169 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also United
States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. ll. 2003) (noting that "one of the few
mechanisms available to the FDA to compel manufacturer behavior is to constrain their
marketing options; i.e. control the labeling, advertising, and marketing" (quoting Wash. Legal
Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 1998), amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16
(D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub nom. Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney,
202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
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created by the Guidance to sidestep the costly and time-consuming
FDA-approval process in order to extend the life cycle of generic
drugs or to increase revenues.co While there may be a compelling
interest in making physicians aware of potentially life-saving
treatments involving off-label drugs, physicians should be more than
capable of discovering and communicating potential treatments to
patients and other physicians without the involvement of
manufacturers, especially since the current Guidelines call for the
distribution of studies conducted independent of the manufacturer.
Since alternative constraints have failed to adequately stem the
growing tide of unapproved off-label uses of pharmaceuticals, the
Guidance Documents, while previously deemed unconstitutional for
lack of fit, may now provide the least restrictive method of limiting
commercial speech by the manufacturers.
Recent Congressional investigations and scientific studies
demonstrate that, even under the more restrictive guidelines
established in section 401 of the FDAMA, off-label uses of
pharmaceutical drugs made up a substantial proportion of overall drug
sales. Under the more relaxed standard set forth in the finalized
Guidance, the growth of off-label drug use is likely to continue. In a
2006 study evaluating the off-label prescription of 160 common
drugs, off-label drug use accounted for 21% of all prescriptions.1
The percentages are significantly higher for anticonvulsants (74%),
antipsychotics (60%), and antibiotics (41%).172 Making matters
worse, in 73% of off-label uses, the application of the drug to the
disease was shown to have little to no scientific support.17 3 The results
of this study demonstrate a significant change from the 4.7% rate of
off-label use cited in Washington Legal Foundation.17 4 Dr. David
Wilkes, a professor of medicine at the University of California Davis,
notes that "[physicians] are prescribing these drugs (off label) that are
often very, very expensive-it's rarely a generic drug, it's always
some sort of trade name drug that has been marketed."' 7 5 Even in
cases where the FDA takes regulatory action against drug
manufacturers for serious promotional violations, advertisements
promoting off-label uses of pharmaceutical drugs may persist in the
marketplace for over a year after identification. The FDA takes an
170 See Stafford supra note 10 at 1427-28.
" Id. at 1427.
172 Id. (citing David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 (2006)).
17 Id.
174 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
15 Sharon Kirkey, Off-Label Drug Use Can Have Painful Consequences, VANCOUVER
SUN, Jan. 2, 2009, at B3.
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average of seven months to initiate regulatory action against a
manufacturer, and the manufacturer takes an average of four months
to reply to the FDA's demand. 17 6 Moreover, these regulatory actions
are not always sufficient to prevent repeat violations. For eleven out
of forty-two drugs cited by the FDA for improper off-label
promotional efforts, the products had received prior citations for
improper off-label use. 177
Possibly of greater concern, a national survey conducted of over
one thousand physicians between November 2007 and August 2008
indicated that many physicians are unfamiliar with the FDA-approved
uses of the drugs they are prescribing. 78 While 95% of physicians
claimed they "generally know the FDA-labeled indications of
medications they prescribe" and 79% of physicians cited FDA
approval as an important factor guiding their prescribing habits, 41%
of the physicians surveyed erroneously believed that some off-label
uses were approved despite lacking or uncertain evidence supporting
them.179 The study indicated that primary care physicians as a group
were only able to correctly identify the FDA-approved uses of the
drugs they personally prescribed for a specified indication 42% of the
time. 80 And, with one notable exception, physicians who prescribed
drugs to patients for off-label purposes were more likely to believe
the use was FDA-approved than their counterparts who chose not to
prescribe the drug for the off-label use.18'
The FDA does not seek to regulate physician prescription
practices. However, these statistics raise serious questions as to the
efficacy of the FDA's limits on off-label marketing. While these
pervasive problems in off-label identification do not necessarily mean
that the journal articles disseminated by manufacturers are inherently
misleading or that they are the only factor contributing to off-label
prescribing practices, it does suggest that physicians are receiving the
wrong message from some source.182
176 GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
177 Id. at 23.
'
78 See Donna T. Chen et al., U.S. Physician Knowledge of the FDA-Approved Indications
and Evidence Base For Conunonly Prescribed Drugs: Results of a National Survey, 18
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 1094, 1096 (2009) (noting that only fifty-five
percent of all physicians surveyed knew the FDA approval status of the commonly used
drug-indication pairs examined).
'79Id. at 1099.
80 1d. at 1097.
181 Id. at 1097 thl.2 (displaying that for twenty-one of the twenty-two drugs surveyed,
physicians prescribing a drug for a given off-label use were more likely to believe the drug was
FDA-approved for that purpose; the only exception was trazodone, which is used off label to
treat insomnia).
182 See, e.g., Posting of Jim Edwards to BNET, Pfizer's West Side Story: How "The
Sharks" Sold Bextra Off-Label, http://industry.bnet.com/pharmal0004061/pfizers-west-side
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Similarly, recent investigations into the peer-review process may
raise questions regarding the accuracy and bias of journal articles
disseminated by manufacturers to promote off-label use. Problems
inherent in the peer-review process challenge the commonly held
notion that journal publications "accurately represent[] the state of
knowledge about sponsors' products."'83 In addition, some scientists
have been slow to comply with journal requirements mandating the
disclosure of relevant financial interests as a prerequisite for journal
publication, and journal editors are often hard-pressed to detect and
punish violators.18 Jerome Kassirer, the editor of the New England
Journal of Medicine from 1991 to 1999,185 admitted that the hierarchy
within medical journals means that:
[s]ome [journals], particularly those journals with robust
full-time editorial staffs and venerable reputations, have the
toughest peer-review standards. Others, mostly those staffed
by editors whose day job is running a department or division,
may not have the expertise to deal with the crush of new
manuscripts. Their journals often receive papers rejected
from the top tier of journals: it is fair to say that there is often
a reason why these papers were rejected; yet they often end
up published in a peer-reviewed journal and could be
distributed by drug representatives. 18 6
Kassirer goes on to explain that at some lower-tier journals, the
peer-review process consists solely of two reviewers checking off
"accept" or "reject." If both reviewers accept, the article is published.
-story-how-the-sharks-sold-bextra-off-label/ (Sept. 3, 2009) (noting that Pfizer marketing teams
engaging in illicit off-label marketing campaigns for the drug Bextra referred to their teams by
aggressive names such as "The Sharks" or "The Highlanders," and incorporated practices such
as providing physicians reprints of articles with the page citing approved drug uses flipped to
the back so physicians would first see the information regarding off-label uses).
183 Bruce M. Psaty & Wayne Ray, FDA Guidance on Off-Label Promotion and the State of
the Literature from Sponsors, 299 JAMA 1949, 1949 (2008) (discussing the misrepresentations
regarding drug safety and efficacy that can result from drug company sponsors' common
practice of declining to publish studies with unfavorable results and the FDA's lack of oversight
over study design).
18See THOMAS 0. MCGARrrY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How SPECIAL
INrERESTS CORRUFr PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 77 (2008).
8 See Laura Johannes, Medical Journal Ousts Editor, Ending Battle, WALL ST. J., July
27, 1999, at 1 (describing how the departure of the New England Journal of Medicine's
longtime editor would likely result in the journal pursuing more financially lucrative ventures).
'Posting of Jerome Kassirer to Health Affairs Blog, Fantasy at FDA: Protecting the
Public from Drug Company Reprints, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/04/23/fantasy-at-fda
-protecting-the-public-from-drug-company-reprints/ (Apr. 23, 2008, 14:40 EST).
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If both reject, the article is declined. In the event of a tie, a third
reviewer casts the deciding vote.187
Surviving a journal's peer-review process does not necessarily add
credence to an article's claims. In fact, it may even be a hindrance. In
a recent study, scientists demonstrated that the "Winner's Curse," an
auction theory where the winning bidder tends to overpay, may apply
to journal publications. 88 As the authority of journals is judged, at
least in part, by selectivity, articles tend to gravitate to research that
shows positive results, with negative or contradictory data merely
discussed among colleagues or at conferences.18 9 Applying the
Winner's Curse theory to the article selection process, journals that
select articles are likely to have overestimated the importance or
efficacy of information contained in the selected article.' 90 The
Winner's Curse theory in turn would motivate prospective authors to
devote more time to developing research showcasing outliers that
produce positive results, as opposed to negative or equivocal findings,
due to the publish-or-perish imperative. This bias in publications
might help explain an overabundance of extreme or spectacular
results: upon evaluating forty-nine of the most-cited papers in highly
visible journals between 1990 and 2004, a quarter of the reported
randomized trials and five of the six reported non-randomized studies
were contradicted or identified as exaggerated by 2005.191
When the court in Washington Legal Foundation held that the
Guidance Documents were overly burdensome, the court relied
heavily on financial disclosure and the peer-review process in
determining that the potential for manufacturers to mislead the public
was negligible.192 Studies since Washington Legal Foundation,
however, have demonstrated that these protections are not enough.
87Id.
'8 See Neal S. Young et al., Why Current Publication Practices May Distort Science, 5
PUB. LIBR. SC. MED. 1418, 1418-19 (2008), available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/aricle/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjoumal.pmed.0050201.
18 9 See id. at 1419 (noting that "in a recent paper, it was shown that while almost all trials
with 'positive' results on antidepressants had been published, trials with 'negative' results
submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, with few exceptions, remained either
unpublished or were published with the results presented so they would appear 'positive"'); see
also Benedict Carey, Researchers Find Bias in Drug Trial Reporting, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 17,
2008, at A20 (noting that while thirty-seven of thirty-eight positive antidepressant trials were
published in journals, only fourteen out of thirty-six trials with failed or unconvincing results
made it into journals).
190 Young et al., supra note 188, at 1418.
191 Id. at 1418-19.
'See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 67 (D.D.C. 1998) (writing that
conclusions reached by academics and presented in scholarly peer-reviewed journals or
textbooks are not "untruthful" merely because the FDA has not yet evaluated the claim),
amended by 36 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), appeal dismissed & vacated in part sub nom.
Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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In the decade since Washington Legal Foundation was decided,
off-label use of pharmaceuticals has increased exponentially despite
the application of the FDAMA.'9 ' The FDA's slow reaction to
violations and the medical community's substantial difficulty
disclosing inherent biases in research 94 establish that restricting
drug-manufacturer marketing to the distribution of journal articles
dealing primarily with approved uses of drugs is a necessary step
towards safeguarding the public from taking unwarranted risks with
off-label drugs.
CONCLUSION
Off-label uses of pharmaceutical drugs can save lives, and
providing physicians with the resources to make informed decisions
about treatment plans should be encouraged. 19 5 However, the FDA is
also charged with ensuring that pharmaceuticals are approved and
properly labeled.19 6 Both Congress and the FDA implemented rules to
allow for the dissemination of medical journal articles while
encouraging the manufacturers to apply for FDA approval, first with
the 1996 Guidance Documents, followed by section 401 of the
FDAMA, and finally through the current Guidance. While the court
in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman held that the 1996
Guidance Documents violated the First Amendment by infringing
upon the manufacturers' freedom to engage in commercial speech,197
the court did not advocate an outright ban on the practice of
promoting off-label uses of FDA approved drugs.198
While Congress implemented section 401 of the FDAMA to
provide a safe harbor from the ban on off-label marketing by
manufacturers, the sunset provision expired on September 30, 2006,
leading the FDA to initiate notice-and-comment procedures to
reinstate many of the FDAMA's provisions as a guidance document.
The resulting Guidance should not have been issued as a Level 1
guidance document. It will likely be practically binding, and thus, is
functionally a legislative rule rather than a non-legislative policy
statement. Although the FDA sought public feedback on the
193 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
' See discussion supra pp. 555-56.
195 Posting of Jerome Kassirer to Health Affairs Blog, Fantasy at FDA: Protecting the
Public from Drug Company Reprints, http://healthaffairs.orgblog/2008/04/23/fantasy-at-fda
-protecting-the-public-from-drug-company-reprints/ (Apr. 23, 2008, 14:40 EST).
'96Cf Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (setting forth the approval
process for new drugs); id. § 352(a) (outlining proper labeling requirements for drugs to avoid
being designated misbranded).
' 13 F. Supp. 2d at 73.
'
98 Id. at 72.
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regulation through notice-and-comment proceedings, the public was
not made aware of the Guidance's true nature, and the rule is
therefore in violation of the APA's informal rulemaking
requirements. The FDA should either have issued its Guidance as a
legislative rule as defined by the APA, or waited for Congress to issue
a new law authorizing agency action. The current Guidance should
therefore be invalidated.
In the future, the FDA should pursue a legislative rule that governs
manufacturer dissemination of journal articles promoting off-label use
by limiting the safe harbor to only allow articles that primarily focus
on the drug's authorized use. The rule should also require drug
manufacturers to apply for supplemental drug applications for any
secondary off-label uses mentioned in a journal article. Even with
these measures in place, the rule would not preclude physicians from
independently seeking out journal articles detailing off-label drug
uses. As a result, patients may still receive sub-optimal or harmful
treatment, such as that received by the Neurontin patients that
suffered from suicidal tendencies as a result of an off-label use that
had little to no scientific support. 199 What the measures would do,
however, is help ensure that pharmaceutical companies do not
actively market off-label uses that have not been subject to review
and approval by the FDA. This in turn helps ensure that physicians
have access to updated and unbiased research to guide their decisions
in prescribing medication for off-label use, which could go a long
way toward preventing the harms caused by the overprescription of
Neurontin for off-label uses based on drug manufacturer marketing
efforts.
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